The United Kingdom has taken a dramatic step in its fight against cybercrime: banning public bodies and critical national infrastructure operators from paying ransom demands, while requiring private organisations to notify authorities if they intend to make a payment.
The new rules, announced this week, are pitched as an effort to “smash the cybercriminal business model” by removing the financial incentives that drive ransomware attacks. But the ban may carry unintended consequences that could reverberate across hospitals, schools, utilities, and the private sector.
“Cracking down on ransom payments is a principled and strategic step. Removing the profit motive has to be part of any long-term solution,” Christian Espinosa, a cybersecurity expert with Blue Goat Cyber, told Afcacia. “But policy alone won’t stop attacks overnight. The reality is that ransomware causes prolonged business interruption: recovery often takes weeks or months, during which services and jobs are at risk. Bans will push adversaries to adapt, and that adaptation can be painful for victims who lack contingency plans.”
The government’s approach draws a sharp line: public bodies such as the NHS, councils, and transport operators are strictly prohibited from making ransom payments, while private firms must notify regulators before sending money to attackers. In some cases, the state may block payments entirely, particularly where funds risk flowing to sanctioned groups.
Officials argue the move is necessary. The National Crime Agency has repeatedly described ransomware as one of the UK’s most damaging cyber threats, causing significant disruption and financial losses across sectors. A public consultation showed strong support for decisive action, with advocates insisting that cutting off the flow of ransom money could make attacks less profitable.
Supporters of the ban point to three potential benefits. First, if public institutions are no longer viable payers, criminals may find those targets less attractive.
Second, the mandatory reporting requirement for private organisations could give law enforcement better visibility into the scale of the threat and help them disrupt gangs. Finally, the government hopes a clear national stance will encourage businesses to invest in resilience rather than rely on ransom as a contingency plan.
Yet the risks are serious. When hospitals, schools, or transport networks are paralysed by an attack, the inability to pay may prolong outages and put citizens directly at risk. Past ransomware incidents have left UK health services offline for weeks. Criminal groups, meanwhile, are adept at changing tactics.
If direct ransom payments are curtailed, experts warn they will pivot to stealing and leaking sensitive data, using double or even triple extortion to ratchet up pressure on victims. Supply chains could also be destabilised: if public services remain offline longer, the knock-on effects could cripple small businesses and contractors that depend on them.
Espinosa warned that organisations should prepare for these shifts now. “Organisations should assume attackers will pivot to data theft, crippling disruption and supply-chain targeting,” he said. “The immediate priorities for UK organisations are straightforward: harden defences, test incident response and ensure you have a credible recovery plan that does not depend on ransom payments. For private firms, the new notification requirement is sensible, as it gives government a chance to advise and coordinate. However, it also means boards must be honest about their cyber insurance and recovery readiness. Ultimately, resilience and preparedness are the only sustainable defences against an ever-innovating threat.”
Experts expect that criminal groups will increasingly turn to public shaming by publishing stolen data, a tactic already on the rise globally. They may also shift their focus to private companies perceived as more likely to pay, or target third-party vendors as an entry point to larger organisations.
What is clear is that the UK’s ban raises the stakes for boards and executives across sectors. Companies must plan for a world in which ransom payments are not an option.
That means strengthening backup systems, investing in network segmentation to limit the spread of malware, and running regular incident response drills that assume no ransom will be paid. Boards must also revisit their insurance cover to ensure they understand what costs can — and cannot — be recovered in the wake of an attack.
For policymakers, the challenge will be to ensure that this bold intervention achieves its intended purpose: starving ransomware gangs of profit while minimising collateral damage to citizens and businesses. As Espinosa notes, the ultimate measure of success will not be in the headlines announcing a ban, but in whether organisations are genuinely more resilient when the next inevitable wave of attacks arrives.
The UK has sent a message to the world: it will no longer bankroll cybercriminals. Whether that message weakens ransomware’s grip or simply forces attackers to innovate in more destructive ways will depend on how quickly organisations adapt to a harsher, less forgiving digital battlefield.